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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY AUTHORIZATION UNDER
CHAPTER 9: A CALL FOR UNIFORMITY AMONG STATES

It is undeniable . . . that Chapter 9 is no longer of interest only to
bankruptcy lawyers. As elected officials, county and municipal managers,
budget officials, bond lawyers, financial advisors and capital markets address
the problems now before them, and hopefully the plans for a prosperous future,
all such participants should become increasingly knowledgeable of what can
and cannot be accomplished in Chapter 9.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Could a municipality of this state file for bankruptcy under Chapter 9? If
so, how would the bankruptcy process affect future borrowing costs and the
value of the municipality’s outstanding bonds? Would there be notable effects
on the bond market as a whole? These questions, often posed to public finance
attorneys, are increasingly relevant in light of the recent economic recession in
the United States. Macroeconomic instability often trickles down to the local
level, and municipal defaults have been shown to follow downturns in business
cycles.2
Key factors for defaults include fluctuating land values, booms and busts
in commodities, and improbable projections of the future.3 From a more
analytical perspective, municipalities struggle to raise revenue in times of
financial distress.4 This is due in part to diminishing property tax values, high
unemployment, and declining manufacturing and construction activity, each
resulting in decreased tax revenues for a city.5 Meanwhile, on the expense side,
these same economic factors increase the per capita costs of operating a
government.6 Finally, unexpected one-time expenses often arise in
recessionary periods, creating fiscal challenges for municipalities that are

1. NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC
FINANCE ATTORNEYS 103 (2011), available at http://www.nabl.org/uploads/cms/documents/mu
nicipal_bankruptcy_a_guide_for_public_finance_attorneys.pdf.
2. Cate Long, Would the real default rate stand up?, THOMSON REUTERS, Apr. 19, 2011,
http://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/2011/04/19/would-the-real-default-rate-stand-up/.
3. NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 5.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 6.
215

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

216

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV:215

unable to quickly raise revenue.7 Such expenses include those that follow from
failed projects, legal judgments against the city, and environmental
remediation obligations.8
When a municipality finds itself in financial peril due to these economic
hardships, it may consider Chapter 9 bankruptcy its most efficient solution.
Perhaps the most recent and noteworthy example is the City of Detroit filing
for municipal bankruptcy on July 18, 20139 in what Michigan Governor
Richard Snyder deemed “the only reasonable alternative . . . available.”10
Detroit’s filing marked the largest municipal bankruptcy since the creation of
the Chapter 9 law in 1938,11 with an estimated $18 billion in outstanding
debt.12 Many of the city’s financial difficulties correspond to those outlined
above. Specifically, Detroit’s unemployment rate has almost tripled since
2000, its roughly 78,000 abandoned structures reflect a lack of manufacturing
and construction activity, and Governor Snyder attributed the city’s inability to
meet creditor obligations to “a decreasing tax base.”13
This comment will first consider a municipality’s ability to utilize the
Chapter 9 bankruptcy law. Particular emphasis will be given to Tenth
Amendment limitations and the statutory eligibility requirements. It will then
describe notable Chapter 9 legal cases, outline the benefits and ill effects of
filing for municipal bankruptcy, and analyze the treatment of bonds in Chapter
9 proceedings. Finally, the comment will argue that states should uniformly
authorize Chapter 9 bankruptcies—both expressly in their statutes and without

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. What Detroit’s Bankruptcy Means for Muni Bonds, CHARLES SCHWAB ON INVESTING,
Winter 2013, available at http://www.schwab.com/public/file/P-6479089/On_Investing_Full_
PDF.pdf.
10. John Bringardner, Detroit Files For Chapter 9, Largest Ever Municipal Bankruptcy,
FORBES, July 18, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2013/07/18/detroit-files-for-chap
ter-9-largest-ever-municipal-bankruptcy/.
11. Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 403, 403 (2014). The first municipal debt provisions were actually enacted in 1934
in response to an estimated 1,000 municipalities defaulting on their bonds during the Great
Depression. The United States Supreme Court found the legislation unconstitutional for
infringing on the sovereign powers of the states. Revised legislation was then enacted in 1937 and
upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Bekins (1938). JAMES E. SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN
AND CUTLER LLP, PRIMER ON MUNICIPAL DEBT ADJUSTMENT 4–5 (2012), available at
http://www.afgi.org/resources/Bankruptcy_Primer.pdf.
12. Michael Corkery & Matthew Dolan, Detroit Bankruptcy Likely to Spark a Pension
Brawl: Filing Will be a Test Case of How Far a City Can Go in Shredding Retiree Costs, WALL
ST. J. (ONLINE), July 19, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873242634045786
16204128866568.
13. Bringardner, supra note 10.
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limitations or preconditions. This change would help create uniformity,
promote predictability, and stabilize the municipal bond market.
II. TENTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
In accordance with the federal Constitution, Congress holds the power to
establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.”14 This authority, however, is limited by the sovereign powers of the
states.15 In particular, the Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are preserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”16 In enacting
Chapter 9, Congress was well aware of the risk that broad municipal
bankruptcy powers could interfere with the right of states to control their
internal affairs in violation of this amendment.17 After all, a municipality is a
mere subdivision or instrumentality of the state in which it is located.18 As a
result, the Bankruptcy Code places significant restraints on the powers of a
federal bankruptcy court to interfere with the operations of a state-controlled
municipality in Chapter 9 proceedings.19
One such restraint can be found in 11 U.S.C. § 904 of the Bankruptcy
Code.20 This section forbids the bankruptcy court from interfering with a
Chapter 9 municipality’s ability to use its property, raise taxes, or make
expenditures without its consent.21 Additionally, the bankruptcy judge is
restricted from forcing the municipality to sell its assets to satisfy a secured
creditor’s lien or appointing a trustee to assume management powers over the

14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
15. Francisco Vazquez, Examining Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy Cases, in CHAPTER 9
BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING
PROCESS, COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES 173,
176–77 (2011).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
17. Vazquez, supra note 15, at 177.
18. Peter J. Benvenutti & Joseph M. Witalec, State Law Authorization for a Chapter 9
Filing, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE
CHAPTER 9 FILING PROCESS, COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS
AND CASES 35, 37 (2011).
19. Leon R. Barson & Francis J. Lawall, Chapter 9 Bankruptcy: Restructuring
Municipalities in Financial Distress, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING
LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING PROCESS, COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES,
AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES 7, 16–17 (2011).
20. John J. Rapisardi et al., Chapter 9: A Big Stick, Rarely Used, in CHAPTER 9
BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING
PROCESS, COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES 153,
157 (2011).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2006).
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municipality.22 Rather, a Chapter 9 municipality retains total control over its
own operations and affairs.23 It is not required to seek court approval before
using, leasing, or even selling property outside the ordinary course of
business.24 Thus a municipality can, in its independent discretion, choose to
make any transfer or pay any claims, including those arising before the petition
for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.25
Consequently, the bankruptcy judge’s involvement is severely limited.26
His or her primary duties are to determine the filing municipality’s Chapter 9
eligibility, oversee the handling of executory contracts, and approve or deny
the proposed plan of adjustment.27 As such, it can be argued that most of the
court’s role only occurs at the front and back ends of the proceedings.28
Accordingly, Chapter 9 debtors typically conduct their affairs without
obtaining any form of prior approval from the bankruptcy court.29 The
municipalities, therefore, seem to be subjected to far less court oversight than
their counterparts in the corporate sector—namely Chapter 11 debtors.30 This
prevents creditors from influencing municipal affairs during Chapter 9
proceedings or gaining any significant leverage in general.31
Congress’ recognition of Tenth Amendment concerns in municipal
bankruptcies has also resulted in strict eligibility requirements for Chapter 9
relief.32 Although a more in-depth analysis of eligibility will be provided in the
next section, one requirement in particular is closely linked to the preservation
of state power. Since state control is protected by the Tenth Amendment and
consent is necessary for one of its municipalities to file for bankruptcy, 11
U.S.C. § 109(c) requires specific authorization by the state for Chapter 9
proceedings to commence.33 The state authorization requirement serves only a
threshold purpose, as once it and the other eligibility requirements are satisfied,
Chapter 9 in its entirety applies to the bankruptcy case without restrictions
from state law.34 As the In re City of Vallejo court explained, the Bankruptcy
22. Barson & Lawall, supra note 19, at 17.
23. Vazquez, supra note 15, at 177.
24. Id.
25. Id.; cf. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006) (imposing limitations on use, sale, and lease of property
by a trustee in bankruptcy). § 901 makes § 363 inapplicable in a Chapter 9 case. Vazquez, supra
note 15, at 177.
26. Barson & Lawall, supra note 19, at 17.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Rapisardi et al., supra note 20, at 157.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Benvenutti & Witalec, supra note 18, at 36–37.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2006).
34. Benvenutti & Witalec, supra note 18, at 37.
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Code affords states the opportunity to “act as gatekeepers to their
municipalities’ access to relief” under the code.35 However, once a state
provides the necessary authorization, it “must accept Chapter 9 in its totality”
and essentially “declares that the benefits of Chapter 9 are more important than
state control over its municipalities.”36
III. STATUTORY ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY
Title 11 § 109 of the United States Code sets out the criteria for qualifying
as a debtor under various chapters of the title.37 Subsection (c) describes which
entities may constitute debtors for purposes of Chapter 9 and establishes five
eligibility requirements.38 These are threshold elements that must all be
satisfied in order to pursue a Chapter 9 bankruptcy.39 Bankruptcy courts are
tasked with scrutinizing these petitions and thus, over time, have begun to
adjudicate the meaning and construction of the 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) eligibility
requirements.40
First, the debtor must be a municipality.41 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) defines a
municipality as a “political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a
State.”42 A political subdivision typically includes a county, parish, city, town,
village, borough, or township.43 Meanwhile, a public agency or instrumentality
generally refers to an entity organized for the purpose of constructing,
maintaining, and operating revenue-producing enterprises.44 The source of the
revenue may range from taxes to income-producing property.45 As a result,

35. In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009).
36. Id.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2006).
39. Seena Foster, Annotation, Eligibility for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Relief, Applicable to
Municipalities, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(c), 57 A.L.R. FED. 2d 121 (2011).
40. Id.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1) (2006).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2006).
43. See In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 601, 601 n.16 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995)
(noting that “case law offers little guidance” in properly defining “municipality”); see also In re
N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 265 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that the
legislative history “does not offer any assistance in determining the scope” of the term).
44. See In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 795 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (reasoning
that whether an entity is an instrumentality depends on “the extent to which the entity has
traditional governmental attributes or engages in traditional governmental functions, the extent to
which the State controls the entity’s operations, . . . and the extent to which the State itself
categorizes the entity as a municipality or instrumentality”); see also In re County of Orange, 183
B.R. at 602–03 (discussing types of entities that qualify as public agencies or instrumentalities of
the state).
45. Vazquez, supra note 15, at 183.
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hospitals, school districts, and highway authorities are public agencies or
instrumentalities and may be eligible to qualify as Chapter 9 debtors.46
The municipality must also demonstrate that it is insolvent.47 Under the
Bankruptcy Code, insolvency is established if the municipality is either
generally not paying or entirely unable to pay its debts as they become due.48
Courts typically analyze a municipality’s insolvency as of the date of the
Chapter 9 filing to determine its eligibility for Chapter 9 relief.49 The first
formulation of insolvency would generally not be satisfied upon nonpayment
of undisputed amounts that a municipality can pay, nonpayment of debts that
are not due, or nonpayment in bad faith.50 On the other hand, the second
formulation requires a prospective analysis and a showing of a future inability
to pay, which often is demonstrated by submitting projections or a budget to
the court.51
In addition, only a municipality that “desires to effect a plan to adjust [its]
debts” may be a debtor under Chapter 9.52 No bright-line test exists for this
determination, as courts instead apply a subjective test and generally consider
direct, circumstantial, or other evidence indicative of the municipality’s
intent.53 If the court concludes that the municipality filed in order to delay or
evade its creditors, it is not entitled to relief under Chapter 9.54
Next, the municipality must satisfy one of the four alternatives set forth in
§ 109(c)(5) by demonstrating that it
(A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in
amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a
plan in a case under such chapter; (B) has negotiated in good faith with
creditors and has failed to obtain the agreement of creditors holding at least a
majority in amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to
impair under a plan in a case under such chapter; (C) is unable to negotiate
with creditors because such negotiation is impracticable; or (D) reasonably

46. Id.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2006).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2006).
49. In re Slocum Lake Drainage Dist. of Lake City, 336 B.R. 387, 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2006) (laying out the principle that “[e]ligibility is properly measured at the time the petition is
filed, not at some later or indeterminable future date”).
50. In re Town of Westlake, 211 B.R. 860, 864 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997); In re Hamilton
Creek Metro. Dist., 143 F.3d 1381, 1385 (10th Cir. 1998).
51. In re Pierce Cnty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 710–11 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009). This
is a cash flow, not a budget deficit, analysis. Id. at 711.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4) (2006).
53. In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280, 295 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009).
54. Id.
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believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that is avoidable under
55
section 547 of this title.

Perhaps the most contested eligibility requirement is § 109(c)(2), which
requires that the municipality be “specifically authorized, in its capacity as a
municipality or by name, to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by
a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize
such entity to be a debtor under [Chapter 9].”56 This element demands further
consideration, as states have yet to reach a consensus on whether or not to
allow their municipalities to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy. Moreover, there are
differing limitations and preconditions among those states that do provide
authorization.
IV. THE STATE AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENT
Prior to 1994, § 109(c)(2) required only that municipalities be “generally
authorized” (emphasis added) to file for Chapter 9 relief.57 Most courts
interpreted this phrase broadly such that the state did not need to expressly
grant municipalities the power to file.58 Rather, the authority to file could be
implied from the general powers granted to a municipality by the state.59
However, other courts refused to imply or infer such power and instead
mandated express authorization.60 Such inconsistency in the interpretation of
the law yielded unpredictable results across the country.
In 1994, Congress responded by amending § 109(c) to replace the
“generally authorized” language with the phrase, “specifically authorized”
(emphasis added).61 Scholars and practitioners believe this amendment makes
clear that, to be effective, the state statute must expressly articulate a
municipality’s power to file for bankruptcy, as this authority can no longer be

55. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5) (2006).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2006).
57. Benvenutti & Witalec, supra note 18, at 38.
58. Id.
59. Id.; see also In re Pleasant View Util. Dist. of Chatham Cnty., Tenn., 24 B.R. 632, 638
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (finding that “the term ‘generally authorized’ as used in § 109(c)
means only that the state should give some indication that the municipality has the necessary
power to seek relief under the federal bankruptcy law”).
60. Daniel J. Freyberg, Note, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State Authorization to be a
Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal Insolvency-And What Will States Do
Now?, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1001, 1007 (1997). For example, one court concluded that
affirmative action from the state was necessary for authorization. In re Carroll Twp. Auth., 119
B.R. 61, 63 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1990).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2006).
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implied from general powers.62 According to the bankruptcy court in In re
County of Orange, the consensus is that state law must provide authority that is
“exact, plain, and direct with well-defined limits so that nothing is left to
inference or implication.”63 Thus far, no court has directly decided whether the
state authorization statute must specifically reference Chapter 9 or one of its
predecessors to meet this eligibility requirement.64
States have failed to reach any type of uniformity in providing the specific
authorization required for Chapter 9 filings. According to James Spiotto, a
bankruptcy specialist with the Chicago law firm of Chapman and Cutler LLP,
fifteen states have laws granting their municipalities the right to file for
Chapter 9 protection on their own.65 Those states are Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington.66
While Georgia expressly forbids municipalities from filing for bankruptcy
under any circumstances, Spiotto explains that the remaining states all want to
remain in the process in various capacities.67
Kenneth E. Noble and Kevin M. Baum of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP
break down the various levels of state authorization differently.68 They find
that twelve states specifically authorize Chapter 9 filings, while twelve others
permit bankruptcy filings only after further action is taken by a state, official,
or other entity.69 Additionally, three other states authorize a limited subset of

62. Benvenutti & Witalec, supra note 18, at 39. Courts have reached a similar conclusion. In
re Slocum Lake Drainage Dist. of Lake City, 336 B.R. 387, 390 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006)
(observing that “specific authorization by a state is necessary . . .”).
63. In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 604 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
64. Benvenutti & Witalec, supra note 18, at 39.
65. John Gramlich, Municipal bankruptcy explained: What it means to file for Chapter 9,
NEWS HERALD, July 20, 2013, http://www.thenewsherald.com/articles/2013/07/20/news/doc51
eaf545c13fd728275659.txt?viewmode=fullstory. Chapman and Cutler LLP has focused its
practice on finance since its founding in 1913 and contains a “Bankruptcy, Restructuring and
Workouts” practice area consisting of over twenty-five attorneys. CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP,
http://www.chapman.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
66. Gramlich, supra note 65.
67. Id.
68. Kenneth E. Noble & Kevin M. Baum, Municipal bankruptcies: an overview and recent
history of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, LEXOLOGY, July 23, 2013, http://www.lexology.
com/library/detail.aspx?g=c47c30f7-e91f-4398-82f3-f0ce5d2ef704. Katten Muchin Rosenman
LLP has a renowned “Insolvency and Restructuring” group consisting of over twenty attorneys.
Insolvency and Restructuring, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, http://www.kattenlaw.com/in
solvencyandrestructuring#overview (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
69. Noble & Baum, supra note 68.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2014]

MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY AUTHORIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 9

223

municipalities to file for bankruptcy.70 The remaining twenty-three states do
not authorize municipal bankruptcy filings.71
Cory Eucalitto, Kristen De Pena, and Shannan Younger created the
following map to illustrate each state’s position on authorization as of February
2013:72

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. CORY EUCALITTO ET AL., STATE BUDGET SOLUTIONS, MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: AN
OVERVIEW FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS 7 (2013), available at http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/
doclib/20130301_SBSBankrupcyReport.pdf.
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States Without Necessary Chapter 9 Authorization

The typology used in the map distinguishes between states prohibiting
municipalities from filing for bankruptcies and states that merely choose not to
enact a statute specifically authorizing Chapter 9 filings.73 However, given the
fact that explicit permission from the state is now believed necessary to satisfy
the § 109(c)(2) specific authorization requirement,74 the states that are silent on
municipality bankruptcy effectively prohibit Chapter 9 filings as well.
Therefore, the two categories can be combined into states that do not permit
their municipalities to engage in the Chapter 9 process. These states are
Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.75
B.

States With Limited Chapter 9 Authorization

Meanwhile, Colorado, Illinois, and Oregon provide specific authorization
but in a limited manner.76 For example, in Illinois, only municipalities with
less than 25,000 residents are specifically authorized to file under Chapter 9.77
However, this authorization is only possible after compliance with a lengthy
and cumbersome pre-filing process.78 On the other hand, cities with
populations exceeding 25,000 must utilize the Financially Distressed City Law,
which provides for a form of receivership proceeding only for “financially
distressed” cities as labeled by the state.79

73. Id.
74. Some scholars, however, argue that despite the shift from “general” to “specific”
authorization, ambiguity remains as to whether explicit statutory authorization is actually needed
for municipalities to file. Christopher Smith, Provisions for Access to Chapter 9 Bankruptcy:
Their Flaws and the Inadequacy of Past Reforms, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 497, 514 (1998).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. David Warfield, Could a Detroit-style bankruptcy happen here?, ST. LOUIS BUS. J.,
Sept. 6, 2013, http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/print-edition/2013/09/06/could-a-detroit-stylebankruptcy.html?page=all.
78. Id.
79. Mark Glennon, Bankruptcy is not an option for Illinois cities or other units under
current law, WIREPOINTS ILL. NEWS, July 29, 2013, http://www.wirepoints.com/dont-count-ona-bankruptcy-proceeding-to-fix-illinois-government-at-any-level/. Therefore, due to their size,
municipalities such as Chicago and Cook County do not have the specific authorization necessary
for Chapter 9 eligibility. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2014]

MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY AUTHORIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 9

225

C. States With Preconditions to Chapter 9 Filings
The following states authorize Chapter 9 bankruptcies but impose
preconditions with which the municipalities must first comply before filing for
relief: California, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.80
California provides an excellent illustration of the principle that states serve a
Chapter 9 gatekeeping function by virtue of the § 109(c)(2) specific
authorization requirement and corresponding Tenth Amendment
considerations.81 As the court in In re City of Stockton, Cal. explained,
California chose to engineer certain parameters of its gate through California
Government Code § 53760.82 It implemented mandatory preconditions a
municipality must partake in before receiving authorization to become a
Chapter 9 debtor.83 In particular, the municipality must first either engage in a
neutral evaluation process or have a fiscal emergency declared by its governing
board.84 This principle is also well evidenced by states like Michigan85 and
Rhode Island,86 among others.
D. States Providing Unfettered Access to Chapter 9
The relevant Missouri statute provides a standard example of the specific
authorization necessary for Chapter 9 filing free from any limitations or
preconditions:
The consent of the state is hereby granted to, and all appropriate powers are
hereby conferred upon, any municipality or political subdivision organized
under the laws of the state to institute any appropriate action authorized by any
act of the Congress of the United States relating to bankruptcy on the part of
87
any municipality or political subdivision.

80. EUCALITTO ET AL., supra note 72, at 7.
81. In re City of Stockton, California, 475 B.R. 720, 727 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Before Detroit’s filing in 2013, investors considered Michigan a state that took measures
for its municipalities to avoid Chapter 9, as multiple requirements were in place before filing a
petition. KRISTEN DEJONG & BETH DOUGHERTY, NUVEEN ASSET MGMT., MUNICIPAL
BANKRUPTCY: A PRIMER ON CHAPTER 9, at 2 (2013), available at http://www.nuveen.com/
Home/Documents/Viewer.aspx?fileId=48362.
86. In May 2010, Rhode Island passed legislation that established the state’s intervention
role in financially distressed municipalities. A three-stage intervention process is now in place
before authorization is given for Chapter 9 relief. Id. at 3.
87. MO. ANN. STAT. § 427.100 (West 2010).
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States that offer their municipalities similar unfettered access to Chapter 9
relief include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington.88
V. NOTEWORTHY CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY CASES
Although little case law exists in the area of Chapter 9 bankruptcy filings,
a few notable court decisions illustrate some of the potential issues that may
arise in a municipality’s attempt to meet the statutory eligibility requirements.
The cases below address specifically the issue of state authorization.
In In re County of Orange, the treasurer of Orange County, California
combined funds into a general investment pool, bond investment pool, and
specific investment account that collectively filed a Chapter 9 petition.89 The
court discussed the specific authorization requirement and ultimately
concluded that it was not satisfied.90 The case was decided in 1995, so this
bankruptcy court was one of the first to interpret the revised language of §
109(c)(2).91 The court reasoned:
Despite the need for specificity, I see no reason why the state authorization can
not be by specific category. For example, the statute could authorize all
‘municipalities’ as defined in the Code to file bankruptcy. As previously noted,
the Code defines municipalities by categories. The state statute could also
name the specific entities within certain categories. That was the approach
previously taken in the 1937 Act by § 81. In either case, the authorization
92
would appear to be sufficiently specific.

In regard to California’s authorization statute, the court noted that it
specifically referenced § 81, a “laundry list of public entities that are
authorized to file bankruptcy.”93 Since § 81 did not refer to an investment fund
or any similar entity, the court found a lack of specific authorization to file for
Chapter 9 relief.94
The bankruptcy court in In re New York City Off-Track Betting Corp.
engaged in a slightly different analysis of the state authorization requirement.95
The entity that filed for Chapter 9 relief was the New York City Off-Track
Betting Corporation (NYC OTB).96 NYC OTB was a public-benefit

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

EUCALITTO ET AL., supra note 72, at 7.
In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 596 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
Id. at 605.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 604–05.
Id. at 605.
Id.
In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)
Id. at 261.
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corporation that operated a system of gambling in which bets placed on a race
were pooled and then paid to those holding winning tickets.97 It was created by
the New York legislature in 1970 in order to raise revenues for the state and its
municipalities as well as to combat the presence of organized crime in
horserace gambling.98 Facing severe financial hardship, NYC OTB filed for
Chapter 9 bankruptcy in late 2009.99
The court concluded that NYC OTB had sufficient authorization from New
York to file for Chapter 9 protection.100 Since the New York legislature had
not passed a statute explicitly granting NYC OTB the power to file for Chapter
9 bankruptcy, the court instead looked to the governor’s executive order that
specifically authorized a filing by the corporation.101 In finding this order
sufficient for purposes of § 109(c)(2), the court deemed the governor’s
issuance a direct and unambiguous order explicitly authorizing NYC OTB to
file for bankruptcy.102 In fact, it held that the executive order followed
Congress’ instructions precisely, as the statute plainly states that “a
governmental officer . . . empowered by State law” may specifically authorize
a municipality.103
Most recently, a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of Michigan
declared the City of Detroit in compliance with the § 109(c) statutory
requirements and thus eligible for Chapter 9 protection.104 Michigan is one of
the twelve states imposing certain preconditions on its municipalities before
authorizing a filing under Chapter 9. However, in Detroit’s case, the court held
that the city received the necessary § 109(c)(2) specific authorization through a
proper governmental officer.105 Namely, Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 263.
100. Id. at 271.
101. In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. at 267.
102. Id. at 267–68.
103. Id. at 268. The court further noted that this reading of the statute in no way frustrates
Congress’s intent to require specific authorization for a municipality to file for Chapter 9
protection. The court stated Congress was perfectly capable of revising § 109(c)(2) if it desired to
circumscribe the power of government officials to provide the specific authorization to certain
municipalities. Id.
104. In re City of Detroit, Michigan, No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Dec. 5, 2013). From the bench, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes stated, “This once
proud and prosperous city can’t pay its debts. It’s insolvent. It’s eligible for bankruptcy. At the
same time, it also has an opportunity for a fresh start.” Reid Wilson, Judge declares Detroit
eligible for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/12/03/judge-declares-detroit-eligible-for-chapter-9-bankruptcy/.
105. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 2013 WL 6331931, at *45.
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issued a written order directing Detroit to file for bankruptcy after obtaining
approval by the governor.106
This process was accomplished through Michigan’s Local Financial
Stability and Choice Act, which allows the governor to declare a state of
financial emergency and appoint an emergency manager with broad powers,
including bankruptcy authorization.107 Although this act was previously
declared unconstitutional by a Michigan state court due to its lack of protection
of accrued pension benefits, the bankruptcy court reasoned that the impairment
is expressly permitted during bankruptcy proceedings.108 Therefore, state
authorization through the act was proper.109
Now that the city’s Chapter 9 petition is valid, Detroit can partake in the
potentially lengthy bankruptcy process. The details of the city’s ultimate
readjustment plan are yet to be determined, but regardless of the outcome, “the
Detroit case will influence the municipal bond markets and public pension
industry for years to come.”110
VI. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CHAPTER 9 PROTECTION
Although the case law demonstrates that issues can arise with any of the
eligibility requirements, perhaps the most uncertainty lies with the specific
authorization inquiry given the varying approaches among states. In
determining whether or not to impose any limitations or preconditions, states
should consider the advantages and disadvantages of allowing municipalities to
ultimately partake in Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings.
From the municipality’s perspective, a key advantage of Chapter 9 is that
the filing of a bankruptcy petition invokes an automatic stay that remains in
effect for the duration of the case.111 This is essentially an injunction against
most actions that could otherwise be taken against the municipality by
creditors and others.112 Significantly, the automatic stay extends to elected
officials and all inhabitants of the municipality.113 Thus, even if the
municipality or other protected persons take or omit actions related to claims
against the municipality that would otherwise subject them to sanctions or

106. Id.
107. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1541–.1575 (2013).
108. J. Robert Stoll et al., Detroit, Michigan, Eligible to File Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, MAYER
BROWN LLP, December 13, 2013, http://www.mayerbrown.com/Detroit-Michigan-Eligible-toFile-Chapter-9-Bankruptcy-12-13-2013/.
109. Id.
110. Warfield, supra note 77.
111. Barson & Lawall, supra note 19, at 9.
112. Id.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) (2006).
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liability, those claims require prior permission from the bankruptcy court in
order to proceed.114
Another advantage of Chapter 9 bankruptcy is breathing room for the
distressed municipality, which is afforded much-needed time to develop and
negotiate a debt adjustment plan.115 Creditor, labor, and most other disputes are
all addressed in one forum, and the automatic stay gives the municipality the
chance to focus on restructuring its outstanding obligations to creditors.116 This
breathing space is crucial for the municipality, as raising new revenues,
renegotiating contracts, and restructuring debts are all time-consuming
endeavors.117
In addition, municipalities filing under Chapter 9 benefit from limited
bankruptcy court involvement.118 As previously mentioned, the court cannot
interfere with the general operations of the local government and does not have
the power to appoint a trustee to take control of the municipality or call for its
liquidation.119 Viewed from a different perspective, the municipality benefits
from access to the bankruptcy judges, who are often experts in financial
restructuring, negotiations, and complex debtor-creditor and intercreditor
disputes.120 As one commentator suggests, “the value of a highly qualified and
experienced judge in helping the stakeholders get to a solution should not be
underestimated.”121
A final advantage is the municipality’s ability to adjust its debts and other
obligations.122 If a plan of adjustment is ultimately confirmed by the
bankruptcy court in a Chapter 9 case, it may provide that unpaid claims of
creditors be reduced, extended and restructured, or both.123 Although there are
numerous limitations to this ability, the plan can provide a fresh start to the
municipality and allow it to achieve long-term financial stability by deferring
or reducing past obligations.124

114. JOHN KNOX & MARC LEVINSON, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, MUNICIPAL
BANKRUPTCY: AVOIDING AND USING CHAPTER 9 IN TIMES OF FISCAL STRESS 9 (2009),
available at http://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publications/Documents/1736.pdf.
115. Barson & Lawall, supra note 19, at 9.
116. Id.
117. KNOX & LEVINSON, supra note 114, at 10.
118. Barson & Lawall, supra note 19, at 10.
119. Id.
120. KNOX & LEVINSON, supra note 114, at 10.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 10–11.
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Shifting now to the disadvantages, pursuing a Chapter 9 bankruptcy can be
extremely costly.125 Legal and financial consulting fees can be steep, and this
represents money that cannot instead be spent on solving the underlying
financial problem.126 There is also an opportunity cost involved, as valuable
staff time is taken away from solving core financial problems and is instead
directed toward managing and responding to the demands of the bankruptcy
case itself.127 The distraction of dealing with a Chapter 9 case can severely
interfere with the staff’s ability to keep the municipality functioning.128
There is also a social cost to filing—the stigma attached to bankruptcy for
both the municipality and its residents.129 The stigma may harm the self-esteem
of the citizens and have an adverse impact on the overall business climate in
the community.130 New businesses may be reluctant to relocate to the
municipality, real estate sales may fall, and general economic conditions in the
area may falter.131 This stigma could linger long after the municipality emerges
from bankruptcy.132
Thus far, few municipalities have filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy and had
their cases reach litigation.133 Therefore, there is little precedent on the
behavior of judges in a municipal bankruptcy.134 As one commentator warns,
“[m]unicipalities that file [under Chapter 9] may be exposing themselves to
risks from adverse judicial decisions.”135 As discussed earlier, adjustment plans
must be confirmed by the court as well.
Finally, a major disadvantage to filing for a Chapter 9 bankruptcy is the
reaction of credit markets.136 Municipalities seeking bankruptcy relief should
expect a negative effect on their credit ratings, at least in the short term.137 The
credit stigma may last for years, especially if bondholders are not repaid in
full.138 Intense scrutiny from the municipality’s creditors and rating agencies

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 12.
KNOX & LEVINSON, supra note 114, at 12.
Id.
Id.
Barson & Lawall, supra note 19, at 11.
KNOX & LEVINSON, supra note 114, at 12.
Id.
Id.
ARTHUR R. O’KEEFFE, BYN MELLON WEALTH MGMT., MUNI BOND DEFAULTS,
BANKRUPTCIES AND BONDHOLDER PROTECTIONS 2 (2013), available at http://www.bnymellon
wealthmanagement.com/Resources/documents/PerspectivesDocs/Muni_Bond_Defaults.pdf.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Barson & Lawall, supra note 19, at 11.
137. Id.
138. KNOX & LEVINSON, supra note 114, at 11.
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should also be expected.139 It is recommended that the municipality provide
timely and transparent information about its financial condition in order to best
position itself to restore its credit ratings going forward.140
VII. MUNICIPAL BOND TREATMENT IN CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCIES
States should also consider how municipal bonds are treated in
bankruptcies when deciding on limitations or preconditions to Chapter 9
access.
Municipalities commonly issue two types of municipal bonds—general
obligation bonds and special revenue bonds.141 It is important to address the
differences between these two types because they are treated differently under
Chapter 9 bankruptcies.142 General obligation bonds are generally paid from
tax revenues and are backed by the full faith, credit, and resources of the
issuing municipality.143 In other words, the bonds are to be repaid by the
general taxing power of the municipality and therefore are based on its overall
financial strength.144 On the other hand, a special revenue bond is typically
repaid solely from revenues generated by the project or system from which the
revenues are derived.145 For example, a special revenue bondholder whose
funds are used to finance a toll road might be repaid only from the finances
collected by that toll. Essentially, the revenue sources are pledged as security
for the payment of the bonds.146
Due to their full faith and credit backing, general obligation municipal
bonds are typically considered one of the safest categories of investments,
second only to securities issued by the United States federal government.147
However, recent treatment of general obligation bonds in Chapter 9
proceedings threatens to jeopardize this principle.

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. What Detroit’s Bankruptcy Means for Muni Bonds, CHARLES SCHWAB ON INVESTING,
Winter 2013, available at http://www.schwab.com/public/file/P-6479089/On_Investing_Full_
PDF.pdf.
142. NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 50.
143. Id.
144. Jay Reding, Municipal Bankruptcies May Force Municipal Bondholders to Accept
Haircuts, LARKIN HOFFMAN ATT’YS, June 29, 2012, http://www.larkinhoffman.com/news/arti
cle_detail.cfm?ARTICLE_ID=908&ARTICLE_TYPE_ID=2.
145. Gina Martin, Payment on Bonds in Chapter 9: Special Revenue vs. General Obligation
Part 1 of 2, GOODWIN PROCTER, Nov. 28, 2012, http://blog.munibk.com/payment-of-bonds-inchapter-9-special-revenue-vs-general-obligation-bonds-part-1-of-2.
146. NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 50.
147. Id. at 4.
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Historically, both types of bonds were treated equally in municipal
bankruptcies.148 However, in 1998, Congress passed “An Act to Amend the
Bankruptcy Law to Provide Special Revenue Bonds and for Other
Purposes.”149 The amendments favor special revenue bonds, as they were
designed to guarantee that municipalities maintain open access to capital
markets by ensuring that dedicated revenues would not be diverted if
bankruptcy occurred.150 In other words, the amendments ensure that pledged
special revenue bonds cannot be used for the general obligations of a
municipality.151 Rather, under Chapter 9, these bonds retain their lien on the
revenue generated by the project and payments are not interrupted by any
automatic stay during bankruptcy.152 Although these protections make special
revenue bonds relatively safe, it is important to remember that the bondholders
usually have no remedy against the municipality if the project revenues are
insufficient to repay the bond debt owed.153
Meanwhile, the typically safer general obligation bonds are treated less
favorably under Chapter 9 proceedings.154 Most of these bonds lack a specific,
dedicated revenue source.155 Therefore, when bankruptcy is filed, a court may
treat general obligation bonds without a statutory lien as unsecured debt and
force their restructuring.156 Payment on the bonds during bankruptcy is likely
to cease.157
Despite general obligation bond treatment as unsecured debt in Chapter 9,
in practice bankrupt debtors have treated these bonds in a variety of ways with
little consistency.158 For example, Orange County, California continued
making its debt service payments on general obligation bonds during its
bankruptcy in 1994.159 Although the payments were not required under
Chapter 9, Orange County fulfilled its obligations regardless and ultimately
paid back the bonds in full in order to stand by its original pledge of full faith

148. Martin, supra note 145.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. There are, however, exceptions. For instance, in Rhode Island, the legislation
specifically placed general obligation bondholders at the front of the line when a municipality
files for Chapter 9 bankruptcy. DEJONG & DOUGHERTY, supra note 85, at 3.
155. BRENDA OJENDYK, NUVEEN ASSET MGMT., DO MUNICIPAL ISSUERS STILL HAVE A
STRONG WILLINGNESS TO PAY GO DEBT? 1 (2013).
156. SPIOTTO, supra note 11, at F-4.
157. Id.
158. OJENDYK, supra note 155, at 1.
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and credit.160 Similarly, when Central Falls, Rhode Island filed for bankruptcy
in 2011, the city continued to pay debt service on its general obligation bonds
due to a new state law making payments to bondholders a priority when in
financial distress.161 Other municipalities, however, decide to contravene their
full faith and credit promise and instead take advantage of Chapter 9’s
automatic stay allowance by defaulting on their general obligation bonds.162 A
recent example is Jefferson County, Alabama in 2011.163
With fiscal problems mounting and tax revenues falling, municipal
bondholders need to be aware of how Chapter 9 bankruptcies can substantially
affect their investments. A municipality often possesses the power to
reorganize its debts by reducing principal, extending maturity debts, or entirely
refinancing the debt.164 As part of the bankruptcy process, the municipality
submits a reorganization plan to the court for approval, and these plans can
directly modify its contractual obligations to general obligation bondholders.165
Thus far, case law has established the principle that under Chapter 9, general
obligation bonds do not need to be paid in full for a bankruptcy court to
approve the municipality’s restructuring plan.166 As one court put it, “if a
municipality were required to pay prepetition bondholders the full amount of
their claim with interest . . . and the [debtor] had no ability to impair the
bondholder claims over objection, the whole purpose of Chapter 9 would be of
little value.”167
Research undertaken by Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”) provides
concrete numbers in terms of returns on general obligation bonds from Chapter
9 municipalities. Since 1970, the average recovery for defaulted municipal
bonds is nearly eighty cents on the dollar.168 Of course, filing for bankruptcy
does not necessarily make defaults inevitable. Moody’s also estimates that
bondholders could recover merely 50% of their investments in the Detroit
bankruptcy case.169 This return threatened to be even smaller before Detroit
160. Id. at 2.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Reding, supra note 144.
165. Id.
166. In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist., No. 7, 98 B.R. 970, 973 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In
re City of Columbus Falls, Montana, Special Improvement Dist., No. 25, 26, 28, 143 B.R. 750,
760 (D. Mont. 1992) (allowing Chapter 9 debtor to impair general obligation bondholders as long
as the other Chapter 9 requirements were satisfied).
167. In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist., No. 7, 98 B.R. at 974.
168. Liz Farmer, Bondholders Losing Ground in City Bankruptcies, GOVERNING, Oct. 24,
2013, http://www.governing.com/news/headlines/gov-bondholders-losing-ground-in-muni-bank
ruptcies.html.
169. Id.
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filed for bankruptcy, as Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr proposed paying back
just 10% of the city’s debt back in June 2013.170 Now, Detroit’s restructuring
plan entails higher recoveries for bondholders at the expense of pension
cuts.171
In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the bankruptcy proposal refunds 60–70% of
total defaulted principal for general obligation bonds.172 However, Moody’s
notes that ultimate recoveries may be higher if the plan for additional future
revenues for creditors is successful, while an ability to execute the plan could
reduce recoveries.173 The variation in returns is also evidenced by Stockton,
California’s recent Chapter 9 proposal. There, recovery rates vary between 1%
and 100% for bondholders, with its largest creditor slated to recover only 50%
of its original investment.174
VIII. CALL FOR UNIFORMITY AMONG STATES
Twenty-seven states currently fall into one of the three categories that
allow municipalities some form of access to bankruptcy relief—”States With
Limited Chapter 9 Authorization,” “States With Preconditions to Chapter 9
Filings,” and “States Providing Unfettered Access to Chapter 9.” This section
will argue that direct statutory authorization, devoid of limitations or
preconditions, best aligns with the goals of uniformity, predictability, and a
favorable municipal bond market. The twenty-seven authorizing states and the
states that de-authorize or remain silent, therefore, should provide unfettered
access to Chapter 9.
Limitations and preconditions afford states autonomy in choosing the steps
they desire their municipalities to take when facing financial adversity. This
autonomy beneficially accounts for the different characteristics and ideals of
each state, particularly in comparison to the unfettered authorization approach.
However, the state autonomy does not account for differences between
municipalities within a state. In other words, the Chapter 9 limitations and
preconditions imposed by a state may represent a strong solution for one of its
municipalities but may be an ill-advised approach for another.
Local municipalities inherently understand their financial situation and
possible need for Chapter 9 relief more so than states, which often consist of
thousands of local governments. For example, in Illinois, it is hard to imagine
that any one of the state-imposed limitations or preconditions is truly in the
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best interest of all 6,963 of its municipalities.175 To the contrary, many states
mandate preconditions that can be extremely damaging to certain
municipalities’ attempts at fiscal recovery. Complying with preconditions can
be incredibly time-consuming. Not only is time crucial to municipalities in
periods of financial distress, but this also represents time that could instead be
dedicated to Chapter 9 proceedings and a corresponding readjustment plan.
Preconditions can also be costly for municipalities already in financial peril,
and these expenses become entirely futile if the municipality ultimately ends
up proceeding with Chapter 9 regardless. In fact, states requiring excessive
preconditions functionally disallow Chapter 9 access altogether. Meanwhile,
unfettered state authorization would support municipality autonomy and avoid
many of these time and financial costs.
The local autonomy argument also ties into the principle that unfettered
Chapter 9 access is the superior authorization category from a fairness
perspective. As one commentator notes, “individuals and corporations can file
for bankruptcy by simply signing a few papers and paying the filing fee.”176 In
this sense, the United States appears to consider access to bankruptcy relief a
fair and fundamental privilege for financially struggling individuals and
entities. Why, then, should municipalities be subject to preconditions and
limitations before being afforded the chance to benefit from a fresh start in
bankruptcy?
In terms of fairness, the previously discussed Illinois limitation seems
inherently discriminatory, as it grants and denies § 109(c)(2) specific
authorization on the sole basis of population. Is it fair to enact such a limitation
that denies certain municipalities access to bankruptcy protection simply
because of their considerable size? On the other hand, Missouri’s unfettered
authorization statute provides the bankruptcy access that is contemplated by
fairness considerations in the United States. Authorizing states should avoid
implementing preconditions or limitations in response to public and political
pressures to prevent municipal bankruptcies.177 Only unfettered access to
Chapter 9 allows municipalities to fairly and autonomously decide whether or
not to regain their financial stability through bankruptcy.
It is also worth noting that bankruptcy can be viewed as a last resort for
municipalities. States switching to unfettered Chapter 9 filing authorization

175. BRIAN COSTIN, ILL. POL’Y INST., TOO MUCH GOVERNMENT: ILLINOIS’ THOUSANDS OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1 (2013), available at http://illinoispolicy.org/wp-content/files_mf/13843
72675Too_much_gov.pdf. Illinois has the most units of local government of any state in the
country, followed by Texas at 5,147. Id.
176. Warfield, supra note 77.
177. For example, Rhode Island enacted preconditions only “in the face of a Chapter 9 filing
by Central Falls,” one of its municipalities. DEJONG & DOUGHERTY, supra note 85, at 3.
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would in no way be precluded from offering those services that otherwise
would be mandated through preconditions. Similarly, complete Chapter 9
access does not preclude municipalities from first pursuing alternatives to
bankruptcy. Examples include revenue solutions, negotiated debt
modifications, and judicial receivers.178 Again, the key is that unfettered
Chapter 9 access affords municipalities the discretion to choose the course of
action that best suits their unique characteristics and financial situations.
Direct specific authorization is also a beneficial approach in relation to the
municipal bond market. On a micro level, the fresh start offered by Chapter 9
bankruptcy allows municipalities to recover financially and, in the long run,
better position themselves to both issue new bonds at relatively favorable rates
and fulfill their corresponding debt obligations in the future. Although
investors may be forced to accept haircuts on their bonds in bankruptcy, the
returns could be far worse if the municipality defaulted without Chapter 9.
Even more important, municipal bankruptcies are historically rare,179 thus
bondholders should continue to expect full payments on their investments. On
a macro level, the uniformity from all authorizing states providing unfettered
Chapter 9 access should, in itself, create stability in the market. The miniscule
risk of a municipality entering bankruptcy and then providing only partial
returns on its bond repayments could even be incorporated into bond prices at
issuance as a built-in insurance of sorts. In fact, a recent study found that
municipalities in states allowing Chapter 9 access already pay a trivial
“bankruptcy risk premium” in relation to their unauthorized counterparts.180
While both the risk to investors and cost to issuers are relatively low, the
chance for recovery that Chapter 9 provides to municipalities cannot be
overstated. From a long-term perspective, this will lead to financial stability
that benefits municipalities and bondholders alike.
Chapter 9 is a tremendous tool for distressed municipalities with benefits
ranging from an automatic stay to limited bankruptcy court involvement. In
addition, many of its disadvantages are disputable. For example, although
credit ratings may initially fall, they can just as quickly be restored after
Chapter 9 proceedings. This was the case for Orange County, which
“recovered from its ‘junk’ rating status in fairly short order after its 1996
emergence from bankruptcy, eventually securing ‘AA’ status from the rating

178. NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 7–13.
179. Mike Maciag, How Rare Are Municipal Bankruptcies?, GOVERNING, Jan. 24, 2013,
http://www.governing.com/blogs/by-the-numbers/municipal-bankruptcy-rate-and-state-law-limi
tations.html.
180. Tima T. Moldogaziev, Sharon N. Kioko, & W. Bartley Hildreth, Bankruptcy Risk
Premium in the Municipal Securities Market, BOND BUYER, available at http://www.bondbuyer.
com/media/pdfs/BBrandeis14-Tima-paper.pdf.
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agencies.”181 Any lingering public perception that bankruptcy is detrimental
needs to change, and fortunately Chapter 9 stigma appears to be on the
decline.182 In fact, Warren Buffett recently stated that the stigma “has probably
been reduced” in light of the filings by Stockton and San Bernardino.183
Finally, the predictability offered by blanket authorization cannot be
understated. The statutes are straightforward, easy to interpret, and bring
certainty to municipalities and investors alike. On the other hand,
preconditions and limitations expose municipalities to the failures of the
political process. Politicians might be hesitant to engage in a politically
sensitive bankruptcy in spite of the best economic interests of the municipality.
Corruption may also play a role. The time has come for states to uniformly
grant their municipalities unfettered access to Chapter 9.
IX. CLOSING REMARKS
Regardless of which authorization category is truly in the nation’s best
interest, the current variation in approaches among states is alarming. This
variation makes it difficult for bondholders, citizens, and even local
governments themselves to properly understand the recovery options of
financially distressed municipalities. Uniformity, predictability, and a stable
municipal bond market should be principal concerns for states.
The outcome of the Detroit case could potentially lead to drastic
authorization changes nationwide and may ultimately modify some of this
comment’s analysis. However, it bears repeating that the city’s situation is
quite unique in the Chapter 9 context. As one commentator put it, “[t]here is
really no precedent for a municipality as large, troubled, and complex as
Detroit.”184 Regardless, the public finance industry should certainly follow the
remainder of the case and carefully scrutinize the court’s final decisions.
TOM D. HOFFMANN
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